Towards Mutual Recognition:
Resources for Interfaith Engagement from the Multidisciplinary “Recognition” Paradigm
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen
ABSTRACT
This presentation seeks fresh resources for interfaith engagement, including using the Recognition paradigm to study our various Sacred Scriptures together. It proposes that this multidisciplinary paradigm may help us negotiate the challenges of unity and difference or inclusion and exclusion among religious traditions. Fundamentally, recognition has to do with how individuals and communities have—or have not—acknowledged, accepted, and embraced the Other, including their value and dignity, without violating their own (or their community’s) self-identification and worth. For that purpose, the presentation considers diverse philosophical and social theory conversations about the concept of recognition as well as recent contributions in emerging Christian theological (and particularly ecumenical) studies.
Introduction
In what follows, I seek fresh resources for interfaith engagement, including studying our Sacred Scriptures together, using the Recognition paradigm in hopes that this multidisciplinary paradigm may help us negotiate unity and difference or inclusion and exclusion among religious traditions. For that purpose, I consult diverse philosophical and social theory conversations about the concept of recognition as well as recent contributions in emerging Christian theological (and particularly ecumenical) studies.
Those of you with a background in philosophy, sociology, political theory, multiculturalism, or related fields might know that recognition is a widely debated interdisciplinary paradigm.[1] Most fundamentally recognition has to do with how individuals and communities have—or have not—acknowledged, accepted, embraced the Other, including the value and dignity of the Other, without violating their own (or their community’s) self-identification and worth. While the roots of Recognition theory go back to antiquity,[2] including early Christian tradition, more recent conversations on the theory typically begin with the historical contribution of the German philosopher Hegel, as well as some other early modern thinkers such as Fichte and Kant).
Although my first encounter with the concept of Recognition happened a long time ago through philosophical and social theory studies, it was through Christian ecumenical studies that I discovered its incredible potential for negotiating the challenges of sameness and difference, belonging or estrangement, and so forth. The more I studied the Recognition paradigm’s potential for negotiating relations among Christian communities, the more pressing the question of the role of recognition among religious traditions also grew.[3] In fact, there is an obvious shared goal between ecumenical and interreligious paradigms as both investigate the conditions and resources for unity-in-diversity, or at least for cordial and mutually supportive relationships, between different groups. Having had an opportunity to participate in both arenas, that commonality certainly has been my own experience.
In contemporary ecumenical studies perhaps the most foundational problem and challenge has to do with the lack of mutual recognition of the ecclesiality of other church communities— that is, their “being … true or authentic” church. Let me give a simple example: Neither the Roman Catholic nor the Eastern Orthodox Church recognize my own Lutheran Church as “church” in the full sense of the word. Rather, they consider the Reformation churches to be merely “Christian communities''
To explain this and other possibilities more fully, I will first briefly introduce the main issues of recognition in philosophy, social theory, and related fields. Next, I will briefly describe the results and insights from the Christiaan “ecumenical recognition” paradigm and thereafter taka a brief look at the role of non-religious factors in recognition. In the remainder of the presentation I will suggest how Recognition theory might illuminate interfaith work, including the reading of our Scriptures. I will conclude with a number of theses and suggestions for future explorations of the topic.
"Recogniton" in Philosophical and Interdisciplinary Perspectives
The urgency of questions related to identity, unity, otherness, and difference today increases the relevance of the Recognition paradigm for us.[4] Yet those questions are not new ones.[5] Issues related to negotiating between the “one” and the “many,” “we” and “they,” and “unity” and “diversity” have been of interest to thinkers for millennia. In addition to contemporary multiculturalism, recognition is a paradigm that has been employed in the discourse on human rights,[6] peacemaking,[7] education,[8] social and political theory,[9] as well as ecumenism.[10]
Among modern philosophers, no thinker has scrutinized the problem of recognition with greater influence than Hegel.[11] His reflections on the intersubjective concept of recognition, particularly through the lens of the master-slave analogy, have continued to inspire generations of thinkers.[12] At the heart of Hegel’s understanding of the term is reciprocal recognition and the idea that one receives one’s own personhood from the Other—and commensurately, helps the other to do the same.[13] The space of the Other is, so to speak, not so foreign a territory that one could not in some sense inhabit it oneself, and that is true for the Other too. The main lesson of Hegel’s master-slave analogy is simply that self-consciousness develops in three stages: First, there is a complete identification of oneself with the other, the slave’s sublation of his or her personhood with that of the master. Second, self-recognition in relation to others emerges slowly, as threatening as that may be to the slave. Third, at the end, there is mutual recognition without any sense of inferiority-superiority.[14]
A programmatic statement that has inspired much useful thinking on recognition in the sociopolitical arena is the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor’s 1994 essay “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.” The essay notes that recognition is a felt need in society, whether for feminists or those concerned about racial divisions or about the challenges of multiculturalism at large. So important is recognition for one’s identity that “[n]onrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.”[15] This need is particularly urgent amidst intensifying multiculturalism.
In addition to Taylor, the German Axel Honneth is another leading contemporary political philosopher who has made significant contributions to recognition theory. His theory of recognition basically consists of three parts: love, respect, and esteem. What can be called “emotional recognition” emerges in the early years of one’s life at home in an intimate relationship of love and worth. “Rights-based” recognition is related to learning to respect and receive respect in the legal structures of society. Esteem is related to a “community of values” in a society that values one’s accomplishments. Honneth is convinced that it is only by being recognized by the most important social groups and communities that our personal being can emerge and develop. This puts the obligation to love, respect, and show esteem — or solidarity, as he also calls it — toward others in relevant contexts in society, Otherwise denial of recognition— or misrecognition—[16] follows.
A useful recent summary of some of the key findings of the wide and continuously growing literature on recognition is that of Mattias Iser.[17] He identifies four:
1. “Elementary Recognitions” based on Hegel’s famous idea that we gain self-consciousness only through a process of mutual recognition
2. “Respect”: It assigns equal dignity and respect to all, which are absolutely essential aspects of recognition. You might recognize the basis for this idea of universal human rights as deriving from Kant’s ethics and philosophy.
3. “Esteem”: The emancipatory or liberation movements of modernity, whether those of slaves or women or persons of color, illustrate the need for esteem. These processes have given rise to the concepts of “politics of recognition” and “identity politics” (which are beyond the scope of this presentation.)
4. “Love” and care as the apogee of recognition have been invoked not only by psychologically based theories (cf. parent-child relationships) but also political theories such as that of the aforementioned Honneth.
After this brief detour into philosophical and interdisciplinary recognition discourse, I turn now to explore its significance and meaning in ecumenical theology with a view towards interfaith potential.
Christian Ecumenical Recognition[18]
At its core, Christian ecumenical recognition “focuses on the possibility of recognizing the other [in this case the other church] as a true church,” and as such it is a key “part of a conscious process of changing the identification of the other [church].”[19] This recognition is exactly that of the World Council of Churches’ document entitled The Church: Towards a Common Vision (2013)It says,”Visible unity requires that churches be able to recognize in one another the authentic presence of what the Creed of Nicea-Constantinople (381) calls the ‘one, holy, catholic, apostolic Church.’ ”[20]
In this light, it is clear how Taylor’s words are relevant to ecumenical works. As Hietamäki notes, his “main concern is how various minorities may coexist and flourish within a majority culture so that neither the majority nor the minorities have their rights to authentic existence diminished. In a similar manner, ecumenical recognition is seriously concerned with the authenticity of the Church both as universal and contextual manifestations.” What makes Taylor’s approach a fitting aid for ecumenical work is that neither his goal nor that of the modern ecumenical movement is “the annihilation of particular ecclesial identities in the name of reconciling differences.” Instead both resist that kind of oppressive uniformity.[21]
The most comprehensive interdisciplinary study on ecumenical recognition is Timothy. Lim’s eponymous book. Putting Hegel’s philosophical reflections on recognition in ecumenical perspective, Lim, summarizes: “The complex consciousness in ecclesial struggle for recognition analogously resembles the multilayered consciousness of philosophy’s commentary on the struggle for recognition to be the bearer of the primary subject’s identity, to win the battle/struggle, and to be recognized ideally as equally valid members of society.”[22]
Clearly this entails a long-term struggle, given the possibility and risks of “misrecognition” and “nonrecognition” when dealing with the otherness of the other and one’s own identity. What is especially important for the ecumenical context is that this struggle concerns both parties, not only the “weaker” one (the slave or Other) but also the “stronger” one (the self or master), albeit differently. The reason is obvious in light of Hegel’s thought: “The lord who was free became dependent on the slave when the lord desired the recognition from the bondsman in order to uphold his status of lordship.”[23]
In other words, both parties need recognition, and specifically mutual recognition, in order to solve the dilemma. Ecumenical recognition can never be a one-way street. Here again Lim’s succinct summary is helpful. He says: “just as the recognition struggle could terminate prematurely or progress to a mutual and equal reciprocal recognition of the other if parties are not aware of the often unconscious instincts and dynamics in the struggle, [so too] the churches’ process of seeking unity could be terminated prematurely or could be expanded gradually if churches are not sensitive to the many apparently insurmountable (theological and non-theological) obstacles.”[24]
Recall that ecumenical recognition “examines whether churches may accept the legitimacy and authenticity of other churches as the Church in the dialogical process towards fuller communion”[25] (my emphasis). In other words, this is a two-way street because, “[i]n order for the Churches to move further towards complete mutual recognition and full communion, they need to reflect on how they understand and claim their own ecclesial identity and how they regard the ecclesial status of other churches and other Christians.”[26] Particularly in this pluralistic and multicultural world of ours, this goal is urgent.
Another recent asset in the search for mutual recognition is the so-called Receptive Ecumenism paradigm originally formulated by the British Roman Catholic ecumenist Paul D. Murray. While related to the standard ecumenical term reception, which is “the process by which the churches make their own the results of all their encounters with one another, and in a particular way the convergences and agreements reached on issues over which they have historically been divided,”[27] the new paradigm goes well beyond it. The primary idea behind Receptive Ecumenism is simple and profound, namely that: “the primary ecumenical responsibility is to ask not ‘What do the other traditions first need to learn from us?’ but ‘What do we need to learn from them?’ ”[28]
The impetus behind receptive ecumenism is to take seriously both the reality of the contemporary ecumenical moment — wherein the hope for structural unification in the short to medium term is, in general, now widely recognized as being unrealistic — and the abiding need for the Christian churches precisely in this situation to find an appropriate means of continuing to walk the way of conversion towards more visible structures and sacramental unity.[29]
For that to happen, receptive ecumenism recommends the following kinds of attitudes and postures: willingness to change oneself rather than the other; “[t]o learn from and across our denominational differences in a mutually enriching way that fosters growth within traditions by finding the beauty of another tradition’s focus”; and openness to continuing growth and change of tradition.[30] In the spirit of receptive ecumenism, in that kind of approach one would be willing for one’s own identity and self-understanding to be affected and transformed rather than working from an assumption that only arriving entirely according to the ready-made plan would qualify as a result.
An additional insight into the potential resources and further tasks of the future of interreligious peace and harmony has to do with Christian ecumenists acknowledging the non-theological factors that cause division, suspicion, and conflict among churches. This observation translates easily into the realm of interreligious relations as well. For that reason, allow me to explain briefly what those non-religious factors might look like.
“Social Recognition”: The Impact of Non-religious Factors
Acknowledging that non-theological factors cause division and suspicion among churches is hardly something new in academic research of Christian unity. Examples are not hard to find. Already in the 1950s, the late French Dominican Yves Congar in his After Nine Hundred Years: The Background of Schism between the Eastern and the Western Churches focused his investigation on political, cultural, and ecclesiological reasons, in other words, on aspects other than typical theological-doctrinal issues that cause such conflict..[31] No doubt, non-theological factors, whether psychological-personal or group dynamics or sociocultural or similar, may at times be more pronounced than theologians have routinely acknowledged.[32]
Indeed, there is a growing consensus that, along with theological, biblical, and tradition-driven reasons, “a complex dynamics of inclusionary and exclusionary intersubjectivities lie behind the ecumenical project since churches also fail to recognize each other for many reasons.”[33] In other words, these non-theological factors have a major impact on the recognition process, or lack thereof, between churches .[34]
To acknowledge and unearth these non-theological factors, theologians and ecumenists who are interdisciplinarily informed have been willing to consult the findings and insights of behavioral and social sciences. Psychology, social psychology, and sociology have served well and have been beneficial to congregational and other empirical studies, including ethnography.[35] The benefits of this interdisciplinary “social recognition” model, as Lim calls it, are manifold. The model, says Lim, “registers the complex, inter-subjective, social-psychological, and relational dynamics involved in the process of recognition. These dynamics operate multi-dimensionally: individual, interpersonal, group, intra-group, and intergroup levels.”[36]
I suggest that the following concepts and observations gleaned from a wide array of interdisciplinary literature on social (re)cognition, group and intergroup and relationship dynamics might be useful for our ecumenical work:[37]
Social categorization, the process of sorting people and things in the complex environment into neat categories facilitates adaptation, group cohesion, and productivity; but it may also lead to intergroup discrimination and intensify intergroup conflict. In addition, it may enhance stereotypes, sticking with “the party line,” and an us-versus-them attitude.
Social comparison, the process of assessing the worth of other groups as well as one’s own, is often linked with social (or intergroup) competition to enhance one’s own group’s value. It may easily lead to overly positive valuing of one’s own group and overly negative assessment of other groups.
Social identification “further distinguishes groups cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally. Like social comparison, it emphasizes or reinforces the distinct and positive identity of their groups from other groups, so as to improve the value of their social identity.”[38] For a person who is trying to strike a balance between assimilating into the group and distinguishing herself from it (in order to affirm self-identity), social identification may easily turn into discrimination or favoritism, among other vices.
The theory of socially shared cognitions refers to the ways in which people process information together in groups. At their best, these cognitions help people deal with complex and confusing situations. At their worst, because shared cognitions are more than just the sum of the individuals’ conceptions, they also have more power to exclude, stigmatize, and attach labels. Particularly important in the formation of group cognition is the role of strong leaders, whose opinions are often followed without much questioning.
Group conformity is a related (inter)group dynamic that significantly influences one’s choices, opinions, likings, and decisions. Conformity is particularly important in the case of (perceived or real) threats.
It does not take much imagination to find examples of each of these features of group dynamics at work in the ecumenical world—let alone in interreligious contexts—in which people from different backgrounds, doctrinal convictions, and tastes associate with each other, or refuse to do so. Those behavioral patterns and attitudes have everything to do with reception, recognition, and mutual acknowledgment.
Having explored in some detail the contributions of philosophy and interdisciplinary and Christian ecumenical studies to our understanding of the concept of Recognition, the focus now shifts to the main purpose of this presentation, namely interreligious engagement.
“Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition”: Recommendations and Suggestions[39]
Although written almost twenty years ago in 2005, Hyo-Dong Lee’s essay “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” is still highly relevant in engaging Hegel creatively for the sake of interfaith work. According to Lee, “the Hegelian notion of mutual recognition...can be the key for…a reconception insofar as it provides a model of interreligious relationship within a common polity that rejects relations of domination and exclusion while nurturing a sense of solidarity among religious communities.”[40]
Lee’s demand for re-conception is critical: “Recognition, as re-cognition, implies the seeing, remembering, and rediscovering of oneself in another and therefore involves by definition some assessment and evaluation of another from one’s existing perspective and criteria, for both individuals and communities.”[41] This is of course the main thesis of Honneth’s book I In The We!
Perhaps nothing else is more important for this joint exercise than reading and studying religious texts comparatively. With the help of the religious Other, I may have some access to what the Other’s sacred Scriptures are teaching and vice versa. I will come back to this theme below. To put this in philosophical jargon, “this process could be called a dialectic of infinity and relative totality, in which one’s totalizing recognitive horizon is challenged and relativized by its encounter with the infinite voice of the Other that breaks into and overflows it, leading to a reconfiguration of the totalizing horizon internally and of its assessment of the other externally.”[42]
There is yet another critical aspect in Lee’s recommendation for taking advantage of the Recognition paradigm, namely his emphasis on its mutuality. That nothing less than mutual recognition is needed is because, following Hegel,
my freedom cannot come into being through a sheer assertion of my sovereign independence, because such an assertion fails to demonstrate that I have freed myself from my self-centeredness, that is, my enthrallment to the purely particular interests of my own at odds with the interests and ends of others, which brings me into conflict with others and proves my claim of freedom to be a self-serving illusion.[43]
Mutual recognition as opposed to unidirectional action has the capacity to bring about what Nancy Fraser calls “participatory parity.” According to her, a community claiming recognition of worth for its religious or cultural practices must show that these practices neither impede the free and equal participation of other communities and their members in the common space of living nor bar some of its own members from being free participants in its internal life with the power to define and represent it.[44]
Returning to the importance of reading religious texts together—the main focus of this conference—I fully agree with the claim of the leading Christian comparative theologian Francis X. Clooney that among numerous ways and platforms of interfaith engagement, perhaps no other venue is as rich and fruitful as common comparative reading of authoritative texts.[45] Indeed, honing the skills of reading theological texts from other traditions is of utmost importance for anyone attempting comparative work. [46] That said, it requires patience, a lot of time, and a trusting mutual atmosphere.[47]
The well-known advice by the German hermeneutical philosopher H.-G. Gadamer reminds us that all true “understanding is ultimately self-understanding.”[48] Rather than being external, understanding is an “internal” process that shapes us. For understanding is not an encounter between “subject” and “object” but rather between two “subjects” whose horizons of (self-) understanding cohere and mutually influence each other. In relation to interfaith dialogue, this means that, on the one hand, I as a Christian should not—and cannot—imagine putting aside my convictions, and that, on the other hand, those very convictions are in the process of being reshaped, sometimes even radically altered.[49] “In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe.”[50]
Pulling it All Together: Tentative Theses on the Way Towards Mutual Recognition
To help us in our quest for mutual recognition and interfaith hospitality, I propose the following theses:
1. That fundamentally, mutual recognition has to do with how individuals and communities have acknowledged, accepted, and embraced the Other, including the value and dignity of the Other, without violating their own personal (and their own community’s) self-identification and worth.
2. Following Hegel, that one receives one’s own personhood from the other and, commensurately, helps the other receive theirs.
3. That the four-fold typology of elementary recognition, respect, esteem, and love might be useful to remind us of the multifaceted and complex nature of Mutual Recognition.
4. That mutual recognition is, well, mutual—a two-way street—and is ultimately needed for the well-being and contentment of both (or all) parties.
5. That mutual recognition recognizes the full authenticity of the Religious Other in the way the Other acknowledges and self-identifies themselves (or their community). This allows the same for me (and for my community).
6. That. following the Receptive Ecumenism paradigm, mutual recognition asks: “What can I learn from the Other?” rather than expecting the Other to learn from me—let alone change their identity to fit my expectations.
7. That mutual recognition taps into the reservoir of the interdisciplinary “Social Recognition” research to identify non-religious and non-theological factors behind the attitudes of non-recognition.
8. That mutual recognition is positive about the possibility of gaining authentic understanding about the Other and the Other’s Scriptures, sharing a common horizon, even if no exhaustive knowledge can ever be achieved.
9. That mutual recognition rejects all forms of non-recognition because of the violence and harmful effects of non-recognition for the Other (including for the Other’s communities).
10. That the mutual recognition paradigm devotes extra resources and attention to minorities and others in special danger of not being recognized.
“But aren’t these principles—as reasonable as they might be—abstract and generic in nature?,” the critic might ask?. “Do they really have the capacity to facilitate mutual recognition at the grassroots level?” My friends, these are legitimate and reasonable comments.The ten theses I just proposed are indeed fairly general principles. As such, however, they are an invitation to my friends and colleagues in various religious traditions and in diverse global contexts to engage in a joint project that we can continue to refine and fine-tune—together.
Together, we scholars and practitioners from various faith traditions could continue building on a long and honored tradition of investigation into and reflection upon the Recognition paradigm, challenging, inspiring, and enriching one another’s insights into this vital topic. What would a distinctively Jewish or Islamic theory and practice of mutual recognition look like? In what ways would it differ from and be similar to the Christian one? My friends, we have a lot of work to do together, now and into the future!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Honneth, Axel. The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition. Translated by Joseph Ganahl. Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2012.
Lim, Timothy Teck Ngern. Ecclesial Recognition with Hegelian Philosophy, Social Psychology & Continental Political Theory: An Interdisciplinary Proposal. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017.
Ricoeur, Paul. The Course of Recognition. Translated byDavid Pellauer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Saarinen, Risto. Recognition and Religion. A Historical and Systematic Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
The Theory and Practice of Recognition. Edited by Onni Hirvonen and Heikki J. Koskinen. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Routledge, 2023.
SHORT PERSONAL RESUME
Rev. Dr. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen is Professor of Systematic Theology at Fuller Theological Seminary and Docent of Ecumenics at the University of Helsinki. A native of Finland, he has lived and taught theology in Thailand, and continues to participate widely in ecumenical, theological, and interreligious work, including in the “Building Bridges: Muslim-Christian Seminar.” An author and (co-)editor of more than thirty books and hundreds of essays, his major project is the five-volume series titled Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic World (Eerdmans 2013–17) which develops Christian doctrine in dialogue with four faith traditions and natural sciences. His most recent book is The End of All Things is at Hand: A Christian Eschatology in Conversation with Science and Islam (Cascade Books, 2022).
[1] For a massive source for the most recent multidisciplinary developments, consult The Theory and Practice of Recognition, ed. Onni Hirvonen and Heikki J. Koskinen. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2023). A concise helpful source is Iser Mattias, "Recognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/recognition/>.
[2] For details, consult Risto Saarinen, Recognition and Religion. A Historical and Systematic Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). The role of recognition in the domain of religion and in relation to religious communities is discussed in idem, “Recognition and Fides: Old and New Paths of Conceptual History” in The Theory and Practice of Recognition, ed. Onni Hirvonen and Heikki J. Koskinen. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2023), 251-69.
[3] Although the link between ecumenical (as in among Christian communities) and interreligious recognition was not lost in the recently completed massive multidisciplinary project at the University of Helsinki titled “Reason and Religious Recognition”—as even the title suggests—apart from historical investigations, nor was the interreligious made a stated theme. This important project, headed by Dr. Risto Saarinen, Professor of Ecumenics, had as its aim “to discover historical patterns and elaborate systematic models of rational recognition and mutual tolerance in religious world-views.” The task is incumbent as “Multicultural societies need toleration in order to flourish. They also need processes of mutual recognition among various groups and stakeholders to avoid segregation and to develop positive group identities. For details, see the project website: “Reason and Religious Recognition.”
[4] Paul Ricoeur has distinguished as many as 23 different usages of the notion of recognition. He groups them under three main categories, recognition as identification, recognizing oneself, and mutual recognition. Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 5-16.
[5] The Philosophy of Recognition: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Bush, Hans-Christoph Bush and Christopher F. Zurn, eds. (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010).
[6] D. M. Yeager, “Recognition, Human Rights, and the Pursuit of Peace,” Perspectives in Religious Studies 40, no. 2 (2013): 167–79
[7] Glen Stassen, Just Peacemaking: The New Paradigm for the Ethics of Peace and War (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2008).
[8] Mitja Sardoc, Toleration, Respect, and Recognition in Education (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).
[9]. In addition to works by Axel Honneth (to be engaged below), see Simon Thompson, The Political Theory of Recognition: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity, 2006).
[10]A massive current study is Timothy Teck Ngern Lim, Ecclesial Recognition with Hegelian Philosophy, Social Psychology & Continental Political Theory: An Interdisciplinary Proposal (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017).
[11]The main locus for Hegel’s philosophy of recognition is to be found in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), also known as the Jena Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, in other translations Phenomenology of Mind (available in English in various versions; the one used here is: G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie [San Francisco: Harper Torch Paperbacks, 1967 (1910)]; from University of Idaho, Department of Philosophy, thanks to Jean McIntire; https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/phindex.htm). The master-slave analogy is in B.IV, “The True Nature of Self-Certainty” (“Self-Consciousness” in other translations), sub-section A.3. “Lord and Bondsman.” Of course, Descartes and Kant (especially) contributed to what became a full-scale philosophy of recognition in Hegel.
[12]A highly useful standard reference is Sybol Cook Anderson, Hegel’s Theory of Recognition: From Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity (London and New York: Continuum, 2009). Theologically I have gained also from Martin J. De Nys, Hegel and Theology (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2009), chaps. 1 and 2 particularly.
[13]The opening sentence of The Phenomenology of Mind, B. IV on self-consciousness is programmatic: “SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or ‘recognized’” (#178).
[14]Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (##176–77) summarizes briefly the three stages (at the conclusion of the discussion of consciousness), just before moving to the topic of self-consciousness, including the Master-Slave analogy in B.IV.
[15] Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25–73; available at: https://www.amherst.edu/system/files/media/1417/Taylor%252C%2520Politics%2520of%2520Recognition.pdf .The original title of this essay was “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition,” from which the citation here has been taken.
[16]Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); idem, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2007); The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition, trans. Joseph Ganahl. (Malden, Mass.: Polity, 2012). For a detailed and lucid exposition in the wider context of political theory of recognition, see chap. 4 in Lim, Ecclesial Recognition.
[17] Mattias, "Recognition", section 2.
[18] This section is based and borrows directly from Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Hope and Community. A Constructive Christian Theology for the Pluralistic World, vol.5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2017), 428-42.
[19] Minna Hietamäki, “Recognition and Ecumenical Recognition — Distinguishing the Idea of Recognition in Modem Ecumenism,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 56 (2014): 458. For earlier use of the term recognition in ecumenical studies, see particularly Harding Meyer, “Anerkennung — ein ‘Ökumenischer Schlüsselbegriff’, ” in Dialog und Anerkennung: Hanfried Krüger zu Ehren, ed. Peter Manns (Frankfurt am Main: Lembeck, 1980), pp. 25–41 and a more recent discussion, consult Risto Saarinen, “Anerkennungstheorien und Ökumenische Theologie,” in Ökumene — Überdacht (Quaestiones Disputate 259), ed. Thomas Bremer (Freiburg: Herder, 2013), 237-61.
[20] Faith and Order Paper no. 214. Geneva: WCC Publications, 2013), p. 9 (in the pdf-version available at: https://www.oikoumene.org/sites/default/files/Document/The_Church_Towards_a_common_vision.pdf .
[21]As succinctly summarized by Hietamäki, “Recognition and Ecumenical Recognition,” 461.
[22] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 34-35
[23] As paraphrased by Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 55.
[24] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 36.
[25] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 5.
[26]“Limits of Diversity?” point d. in The Nature and Mission of the Church: A Stage on the Way to a Common Statement. Faith and Order Paper no. 198 (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2005), #63 (available at: https://www.oikoumene.org/sites/default/files/Document/FO2005_198_en.pdf )
[27] “The Nature and Purpose of Ecumenical Dialogue.” In The Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches: Eighth Report, 1999–2005 (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2005), #59 (pp. 82–83) (Appendix D).
[28] This definition can be found, e.g., in Durham University. “About Receptive Ecumenism” at https://www.durham.ac.uk/research/institutes-and-centres/catholic-studies/research/constructive-catholic-theology-/receptive-ecumenism-/
[29] Paul D. Murray, “Introducing Receptive Ecumenism.” Ecumenist: A Journal of Theology, Culture, and Society 51, no. 2 (2014): 1. See further, Receptive Ecumenism and the Call to Catholic Learning: Exploring a Way for Contemporary Ecumenism, ed. P. D. Murray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[30] Durham University, “About Receptive Ecumenism,” emphasis in original.
[31] Yves Congar, After Nine Hundred Years: The Background of Schism between the Eastern and the Western Churches (New York: Fordham University Press, 1959); discussed in detail in Lim, Ecclesial Recognition,” chap. 5.
[32] Korinna Zamfir, “Is There a Future for the Catholic-Protestant Dialogue? Non-Reception as Challenge to Ecumenical Dialogue,” in Receiving “The Nature and Mission of the Church”: Ecclesial Reality and Ecumenical Horizons for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Paul M. Collins and Gerard Mannion (New York: T & T Clark, 2008), 87–92.
[33] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 29.
[34] Lim, “Ecclesial Recognition,” 31.
[35] Perspectives on Ecclesiology and Ethnography, ed. Pete Ward (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2012).
[36] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 65.
[37] Directly cited from my Hope and Community, 441, based on chap. 3 of Lim, Ecclesial Recognition. Because of the rich documentation therein, references are not produced here.
[38] Lim, Ecclesial Recognition, 81.
[39] The first part of the heading is borrowed from Hyo-Dong Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition: A Postcolonial Rereading of Hegel for Interreligious Solidarity,” Journal of Religion 85 no. 4 (Oct 2005): 555–581.
[40] Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” 555–56
[41] Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” 568.
[42] Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” 575.
[43] Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” 564.
[44] As summarized by Lee, “Interreligious Dialogue as a Politics of Recognition,” 570 on the basis of Nancy Fraser, “Recognition without Ethics?” in Recognition and Difference, ed. Scott Lash and Mike Featherstone (London: SAGE, 2002), 34-35.
[45] Francis X. Clooney, SJ, Comparative Theology: Deep Learning across Religious Borders (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) 58.
[46] This section draws directly from Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Doing the Work of Comparative Theology. A Christian Primer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2020), “Introduction: What is Comparative Theology? Why Do We Need It” (pp. 1-12).
[47] For guidance in reading for comparative theology work, see Clooney, Comparative Theology, chap. 4.
[48] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, 2006 [1960]), 251, emphasis removed. For reminding me of Gadamer’s importance to interfaith conversation, I wish to acknowledge Kristin Johnston Sutton, “Salvation after Nagarjuna: A Reevaluation of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Soteriology in Light of a Buddhist Cosmology” (PhD diss., Graduate Theological Union, 2002), 2–16.
[49] See Sutton, “Salvation after Nagarjuna,” 4–5.
[50] Gadamer, Truth and Method, 484.