Sociology and Biology of Lifelines
I aim to articulate a compelling and nuanced intervention in the discourse of systems sociology by reintroducing phenomenology—particularly through the embodied lens of Merleau-Ponty—and aligning it with ecological and epigenetic paradigms.
In systems sociology, Edmund Husserl's phenomenology continues to serve a foundational role in conceptualizing autopoiesis and communication. The phenomenological structure of meaning, as delineated through the noesis–noema correlation, is often repositioned within a cybernetic framework, particularly in the work of Niklas Luhmann. However, I argue that a more robust understanding of communication systems necessitates incorporating the ecology of collective behavior and the critical neuroscience of lifelines—elements largely absent in Luhmann’s theory.
Where Luhmann's systems theory abstracts communication into a recursive self-referential process, my approach insists on grounding systemic communication in the embodied and material dimensions of life processes. Here, ecological and epigenetic factors—central to the regulation of behavior and the shaping of lifelines—serve as vital mediators in the co-constitution of meaning and social stratification. These dimensions more closely align with the phenomenology of perception and embodiment articulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose emphasis on the lived body situates cognition and meaning within an ecological milieu.
This ecological-epigenetic reframing of systems sociology opens a path toward integrating scientific and philosophical discourses through a materialist phenomenology—one that recognizes the elective affinities between lifeline plasticity, environmental constraints, and the reproduction of social power structures. By foregrounding embodiment, perception, and the biological embedding of experience, this perspective reorients systems theory toward a more critically grounded account of communication, one sensitive to both stratified material interests and the lived dynamics of social life.
Communication and Systems
Neurobiological research finds a conceptual apex in Luhmann’s systems theory of communication, which integrates elements of Husserl’s phenomenology. Luhmann adapts the Husserlian correlation between the intentionality of consciousness (noesis) and its regime of meaning (noema) within the framework of social systems theory. In Luhmann’s interpretation, Husserl anticipates key aspects of second-order cybernetics, including operationally closed, autopoietic systems and radical constructivism.[1]
Drawing on the biological theory of autopoiesis, Luhmann conceptualizes systems theory around three primary types: systems of communication (social systems), systems of life (such as bodies, brains, and cells), and systems of consciousness (minds). Each system interacts with the others through its environment, maintaining operational closure while remaining structurally coupled. This framework exemplifies Luhmann’s innovative synthesis of biology and social theory. Communication, in this context, is not confined to interpersonal dialogue; rather, the linguistic turn broadens it to include the complex processes of meaning-making that occur within each social system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Rose
Ecological-Systemic Constellation
In engaging with Luhmann’s systems sociology, it becomes important to extend the ecological horizon of collective behavior into the domain of communication systems. Deborah Gordon, Professor of Biology at Stanford University, offers an ecological-systemic framework for understanding how collective behavior functions through dynamic interactions both within and beyond a system. Neural activity in the brain, for example, responds to a world filled with shifting patterns, environmental stimuli, and the presence of other beings. Connections among neurons emerge through a dynamic and dialectical relationship that prompts individual neuronal actions. Gordon refers to this perspective as ecological oikos, emphasizing the interdependent interactions that regulate systemic organization.[2]
If biology is understood as a system of relations, then a cell’s function depends on its interactions with other cells. This ecological perspective highlights how autopoietic networks operate without centralized control. In sociological terms, this leads to an epistemic constellation that emphasizes the evolution and plasticity of collective behavior—its capacity to regulate and adapt in response to changing social environments.[3]
In a similar vein, Luhmann classifies all societies—past, present, and future—as systems in which social evolution progresses through increasing complexity, multiplicity, and plasticity, along with processes of functional differentiation. His systems theory makes a universal claim, grounded in cybernetics and oriented around the concept of meaning (Sinn). By generalizing core cybernetic concepts, Luhmann reinterprets biological notions such as system/environment distinctions and complexity to reinforce the sociological centrality of meaning. In doing so, he frames meaning within a model of cybernetic circularity, integrating feedback mechanisms into the structure of social systems.[4]
Thus, Luhmann situates society within communication systems, where humans engage with multiple, overlapping realities. Human action operates exclusively within these networks of communication. From this perspective, observation becomes a fundamental component of systems, both distinguishing and constructing reality through their own operational autopoiesis. If reality is conceived as a cognitive construct—that is, as an effect or correlate of observation—then any description of reality is ultimately a description of an observation.
Second-order observation, or second-order cybernetics, becomes particularly significant in modern society, as it pertains to how observing systems construct their own realities. This recursive feedback is especially evident in fields such as politics and mass media, where systems observe and influence both themselves and one another.
Second-order observation entails reflecting on first-order observation: not just stating, for example, “this book is green,” but asking why it is perceived as green. Every observation inevitably involves a blind spot; no perception is free from bias or prejudice. Thus, our access to "truth" is always mediated by our cognitive limitations. Reality, in this framework, is not a neutral given but a construct shaped by the capacities and constraints of observation.
The second aspect of general second-order cybernetics is not aimed at eliminating or unmasking all blind spots. Instead, systems theory of society recognizes second-order observation as a structural condition of systemic reality—one that acknowledges multiplicity and complexity. Accordingly, all modern function systems engage in the observation of their own operations, effectively operating at the level of second-order observation. [5]
Life-world Construction: Responsbile Critique and Emancipation
Given the relationship between first-order and second-order observation, I sense a lack of immanent critique in addressing the disparity between system and operation—and, consequently, the potential for distortion. The intentionality behind immanent critique, and the emancipatory project grounded in Husserl’s theory of the life-world, serves to question what is culturally sedimented and stratified—such as prejudice, opacity, and hierarchical domination.
This ideology-critical dimension of communicative theory is central to Habermas’s debate with Luhmann, as it challenges the limitations of social-technological analysis, which is constrained by its functionalist orientation toward rationalization and its narrow interpretation of social phenomena. Luhmann’s sociology, according to Habermas, tends to sideline practical moral reasoning and political agency, instead reinforcing technocratic functionality and the legitimacy of science-driven political decisionism.
Despite his well-founded critique of these limitations, Habermas acknowledges that Luhmann’s theory goes beyond a simplistic model of social cybernetics. Luhmann develops a theory grounded in empirical observation and biological application—particularly in relation to the life of organisms. Here, the biological organism is conceptualized as a self-regulating system, a model that Luhmann extends to society and culture as frameworks for meaningful action and rationality. This suggests a systems model that integrates organism and environment in terms of complexity and self-regulation (Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 369–501).
With that said, I propose an integration of Habermas’s theory of communicative action with Luhmann’s theory of system communication, framed through a theory of social stratification that references the lifeworld. Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld as the foundational source of meaning and rationality cannot be fully understood without recognizing its role in the critical examination of cultural sedimentation and hierarchical obscurities. This critique is essential to its emancipatory potential.
Moreover, the lifeworld is not limited to language, culture, or society; it also possesses structure and systemic dimensions that are crucial for understanding the phenomena of biological life and emergence. In this sense, the lifeworld entails an ecological-systemic perspective on the networks of life that constitute the natural world. It should be conceived as a general and ecological structure—not merely as the counterpart to the system (e.g., politics, economy, mass media) in the conventional antithesis between system and lifeworld (e.g., civil society and deliberative democracy).
We should not separate cultural history from natural history. Instead, we must seek to unify these realms, viewing the lifeworld as both structure and system—a dynamic interface between human meaning and ecological emergence.
This critical-emancipatory stance becomes essential for advancing systems sociology, particularly when engaging with a critical neuroscience of lifelines and social epigenetics. Ecological and epigenetic factors must be taken into account in understanding the collective behavior of organisms, offering a richer, more integrated framework for systemic inquiry.
Autopoiesis and Theory of Lifelines
To deepen the connection between autopoiesis and social epigenetic factors, I reinterpret Varela’s concept of autopoiesis through the lens of the phenomenology of lifelines. Varela frames autopoiesis as the integration of biological cellular networks with neuroscientific theories of lifelines, such as those proposed by Steven Rose, a prominent neuroscientist, biologist, and public intellectual in the Britain.
According to Steven Rose, the biological study of Lifelines: Life beyond the Gene is an effort to articulate what it means to “think like a biologist” about the nature of living processes. It involves analyzing both the strengths and limitations of the reductionist tradition that has dominated much of modern biology, offering an alternative framework that transcends genetic reductionism and sociobiology. A critical theory of lifelines stands in contrast to the ultra-Darwinian assumption that places the gene at the center of life, and instead advances a perspective known as homeodynamics.
This homeodynamic view offers an alternative vision of living systems—one that acknowledges the role and influence of genes without subscribing to genetic determinism. It reorients our understanding of living organisms and their developmental trajectories through time and space, situating them at the core of a dynamic, relational, and context-sensitive model of biological life: the biological homeodynamic lifeline (Rose, Lifelines: Life Beyond The Gene, 2003).
Organisms—and indeed ecosystems—develop, mature, and age through the arrow of time and the variability of space, in constant interaction with the organism’s own developmental trajectory. The central property of all life is autopoiesis: the capacity and necessity of a system to build, maintain, and preserve itself. This principle aligns philosophically with the notion of life intentionality or conatus—the innate striving of a living being to persist in its existence and to enhance itself—as articulated by Spinoza and later developed by Hans Joas.
At this point, I engage with key concepts like homeodynamics, autopoiesis, life inyentionality, and complexity. I argue for centering cells and organisms within networks as fundamental units of living processes, situated within an ecological-systemic framework. This stance challenges the gene-centered view of life, which focuses narrowly on chemical compounds like nucleic acids—DNA and RNA.
Indeed, metabolic complexity serves as a heuristic device, demonstrating that gene function and activity can only be fully understood in the broader context of metabolic processes and networks operating across multiple levels.
By synthesizing autopoiesis with a theory of lifelines, I aim to strengthen the socio-critical dimensions of the phenomenology of the life-world, emphasizing intentionality, agency, and multiplicity. This synthesis is further mediated by epigenetic social factors, highlighting the interplay between biological and social realms.
A phenomenological discourse of multiplicity within the horizon of the life-world argues for a deeper understanding of how meanings and intentions are shaped and negotiated through language. While these concepts can be translated into neurodynamic or biological-computational frameworks, I find it challenging to fully embrace such language or metaphors—such as those of selfish genes or the self-sacrificing morality and loyalty of social insects as portrayed in Wilson’s Anthill.
Varela, along with Thomson, aligns with a critical theory of lifelines that serves as a corrective to “ultra-Darwinism” and sociobiology. Steven Rose revitalizes Dobzhansky’s famous assertion—“nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”—by arguing that, more precisely, nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of history. As Rose states, “the past is the key to the present,” positioning history as a fundamental subject of biological inquiry.[6]
Lifeworld and Prolepsis
A genealogy of the past is necessary to rewrite our present history and to explore the socio-cultural dimensions of collective behavior. An immanent critique is required to emancipate us from entrenched prejudices and obscurities. This historical-social spectrum helps to elucidate the horizon of evolution in terms of organismal development. As Merleau-Ponty argues, history does not walk on its head, nor with its feet—but with its body. Bodily intentionality serves as the site for the genesis of meaning, opening us to the lifeworld.[7]
At this juncture, I argue that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of ecological embodiment. Similarly, Varela reinforces a systemic conception of autopoiesis that emphasizes the significance of history and the embodied nature of cognition. Living systems continuously produce themselves through their own activity within the course of evolutionary history; this autopoietic stance forms the backbone of lifelines, situating the embodied organism at the core of biological life.
Likewise, Steven Rose integrates the notion of autopoiesis into his science of lifelines. He seeks to transcend traditional dichotomies—such as nature versus nurture, gene versus environment, and determinism versus freedom—by emphasizing the plasticity of living organisms. This self-construction, which refers to autopoiesis, is a central characteristic of all life, reflecting the organism’s autonomous capacity to create, sustain, and evolve itself.[8]
Given this, I propose a phenomenology of lifelines situated within an ecological-systemic framework, challenging the reductionism inherent in DNA-centered conceptions of living systems. This approach resonates deeply with the spectrum of the lifeworld, understood not only as a cultural-linguistic horizon but also as an embodied, ecological structure of meaning. A phenomenological "thick description" of prolepsis—a forward-leaning intentionality or propension—is developed within the genre of narrative, encompassing past, present, and future.
Such a proleptic orientation is vital for advancing a public theology of science and lifelines, one that anticipates the eschatological reality of a "new heaven and new earth" already breaking into our midst. This vision is grounded in God's reconciliation with the world through the death and resurrection of Christ. God, as the God of life, moves in concursus with living creatures—granting freedom, autonomy, and creativity as gracious gifts, out of divine love and accompaniment.
[1] Luhmann, Die neuzeitlichee Wissenschaften und die Phänomenologie, 47.
[2] Gordon, The Ecology of Collective Behavior, 2.
[3] Ibid., 7.
[4] Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 369-73.
[5] Moeller, Luhmann Explained From Souls to Systems, 75.
[6] Thompson and Varela, “Autopoiesis and Lifelines,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1999) 22:5. 900.
[7] Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, XIX.
[8] Rose, “Précis of Lifelines: Biology, freedom, determinism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1999) 22, 871–921.