Communication and Systems
The neuron biological research finds its apex in Luhmann’s systems theory of communication, utilizing Husserl’s phenomenology. Luhmann emphasizes Husserlian correlation between intentionality of consciousness (noesis) and its regime of meaning (noema) into the social systems theory. In Luhmann’s view, Husserl had utilized a theory of second-order cybernetics, operationally-closed autopoietic systems, and radical constructivism.[1]
Based on a biological theory of autopoiesis, Luhmann conceptualizes systems theory in three main types: systems of communication (social systems), systems of life (bodies, the brain, cell, among others), and systems of consciousness (minds). Each system is in relationship with each other’s environment. This refers to Luhmann’s creative synthesis of biology with social theory of systems. A concept of communication is not merely restricted to personal dialogue, but a linguistic turn entails a broader spectrum of communication in each social system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_Rose
Ecological-Systemic Constellation
In dealing with Luhmann’s systems sociology, I find it significant to complement the ecological horizon of collective behavior onto the system of communication. According to Deborah Gordon, Professor of Biology at Stanford University provides an ecological-systemic approach to comprehending how collective behavior operates in the dynamic relation on the inside and outside. Neuron functionality in brains works in response to the world, which is filled with patterns, changes, and other beings. The connection among neurons is generated in the dynamic-dialectical relationship, eliciting the action of each one. She terms this approach with ecological oikos, exploring the interactions that regulate systems.[2]
If biology is defined as a system of relations, a cell’s function relies on its relation with other cells. This ecological stance features the way the autopoietic network operates without central controls. Sociologically put, an epistemic constellation focuses on the evolution of plasticity of collective behavior, as it is capable of regulating or adjusting collectively to the current situation of social environment.[3]
In a like manner, Luhmann classifies all of societies (the past, the present, the future) as the systems in which social evolution has continued to steer through complexity, multiplicity, and plasticity along with functional differentiations. His systems theory requires a universal claim, and cybernetics is utilized on the basis of the sense (or meaning). Generalizing the basic concept of cybernetics, he interprets biological notion, such as system/environment or complexity, to enhance the idea of meaning (a basic concept of sociology) in terms of cybernetic circularity.[4]
Thus, he identifies society within the communication systems, in which humans enter diverse multiple realities. Humans work only within a network of communication systems. In this position, observation is an integral part of the systems in distinguishing and constructing reality—in its own operational autopoiesis. If reality is conceived as a cognitive construct, thus as an effect or correlate of observation; then the description of reality becomes that of an observation.
The second order observation or second order cybernetics is more important in modern society, as concerned with the reality-construction of observing systems; this feedback can be seen, for instance, in the case of politics and mass media.
The second-order observation involves the first-order observation (this book is green), observing why it is green. No observation without a blind spot or prejudice can bring us closer to the essential light of truth, because reality is constructed by our cognitive capacity- not free of biases.
The second aspect of general second-order cybernetics is not concerned with clearing away or unmasking all the blind spots. Rather, systems theory of society takes into account second-order observation as a condition of systemic reality, multiplicity and complexity.[5] Likewise, all modern function systems practically observe their own operations in reference to the level of second-order observation.
Given the relation between the first order and the second order, however, I sense that there is a lack of immanent critique in dealing with the disparity between system and operation, and therefore, potential effects of distortion. The intentionality of immanent critique and project of emancipation a la Husserl’s theory of life-world problematizes what is taken for granted in the cultural sedimentation and stratification such as prejudice, obscurity, and hierarchical domination.
This critical-emancipatory position becomes crucial in advancing the systems sociology in dealing with a critical neuroscience of lifelines and social epigenetics; ecological-epigenetic factors are taken into account in exploring collective behavior of organisms.
Autopoiesis and Theory of Lifelines
To advance relevance between autopoiesis and social epigenetic factors, I reinterpret Varela’s idea of autopoiesis for the phenomenology of lifelines. Varela gives account to the concept of autopiesis in terms of combining the biological network of cells with neuron scientific theory of lifelines (Steven Rose).
In dealing with important concepts such as homeodynamics, autopoiesis, and complexity, I make the case for placing cells and organisms in networks at the center of living processes within an ecological-systemic frame of reference. This position confronts a genetic-centered view of life drawing upon chemical compounds of nucleic acids, DNA and RNA.
In fact, metabolic complexity provides a heuristic device of explanation of how gene function and action can only be understood in the context of the metabolic process and network at multiple levels.
Synthesizing autopiesis with a theory of lifelines, I seek to strengthen socio-critical dimensions of phenomenology of life-world in terms of intentionality, agency and multiplicity. It can be mediated through epigenetic social factors.
A phenomenological discourse of multiplicity within the horizon of life-world makes the case for a substantial understanding of the way that meanings and intentions come to terms with language. Although these concepts may be translated into neurodynamic terms, or biological-computational context, I find it difficult to use this type of language or metaphor applied to selfish genes or self-sacrificing morality and loyalty of social insects as described in Wilson’s Anthill.
Valera together with Thomson agrees with critical theory of lifelines as the corrective to the “ultra-Darwinism” or sociobiology. Steven Rose reinvigorates Dobzhansky’s assertion – “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”—by claiming that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of history. “The past is the key to the present,” so that the history becomes a subject matter of biology.[6]
A genealogy of the past is needed to rewrite our present history in exploring social cultural dimensions of collective behavior. An immanent critique is required in order to emancipate us from previous prejudices and obscurities. A historical social spectrum comes into explicating the horizon of evolution in terms of organism development. As Ponty argues, history does not walk on its head, nor with its feet—but with its body. The bodily intentionality is the site of the genesis of meaning in openness to the life-world.[7]
At this juncture, I argue that nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of ecological embodiment. In a similar vein, Valera strengthens a systemic idea of autopoiesis in reference to the significance of the history and embodiment of cognition. Living systems produce themselves continuously through their own activity in the course of evolutionary history; an autopietic stance undergirds the backbone of lifelines, situating the organism embodied at the heart of biological life.
Likewise, Steven Rose incorporates a notion of autopoiesis into his science of lifelines. He
seeks to transcend the dichotomies surrounding nature and nurture, gene and environment, determinism and freedom through the plasticity of the living organism. Its self-construction refers to autopoiesis, a central phenomenon of all life, whose capacity is autonomously to create, sustain, and evolve itself.[8]
Given this, I identify a phenomenology of lifelines in an ecological, systemic framework, running counter to a reductionism of DNA-centered view of living systems.
[1] Luhmann, Die neuzeitlichee Wissenschaften und die Phänomenologie, 47.
[2] Gordon, The Ecology of Collective Behavior, 2.
[3] Ibid., 7.
[4] Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, 369-73.
[5] Moeller, Luhmann Explained From Souls to Systems, 75.
[6] Thompson and Varela, “Autopoiesis and Lifelines,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1999) 22:5. 900.
[7] Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, XIX.
[8] Rose, “Précis of Lifelines: Biology, freedom, determinism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1999) 22, 871–921.