Paul S. Chung
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shift implies a structure of scientific revolution from normal science to a new model in solving anomalies, which are riddled with the existing scientific model. Epistemological rupture takes place in the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques as shared by the members of a given community.[1]
Such epistemological rupture heads toward a creative new synthesis, which can be seen as a flourishing project in the science-religion dialogue over the years; the fruitful interaction has contributed to new achievements in reshaping and enriching an agenda of theology of nature as one of the most distinguished regimes of public theology in terms of scientific conceptual clarity.
On the other hand, an engagement with the living system of self-organizing (autopoiesis) remains central in Nikas Luhmann, an influential German social scientist. His systems sociology remarks a paradigm shift from an anthropocentric model to a systems communication model.
The term autopoiesis is made up of Greek components autos (self) and poiesis (poetry means making)—the autonomy of self-organizing systems. This technical term remains critical and constructive at the crossroad between the physical, the social, and the religious.
A Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana coined the concept to explain how biological systems such as cells are a product of their own circular structures, taking on the concept of a circular reproduction of the cell.[2]
In the philosophy of Aristotle, praxis is an action that includes its purpose in the process of self-realization (entelechy) in the life of the polis. Poiesis implies something that produces something as its product. Thus Maturana seeks the bridge between the two concepts through the combination of autopoiesis.
Moreover, Francisco Varela, who closely worked with Maturana, gives account of the concept of autopoiesis, not merely at biological level. The broader concept of organization finds its defining role in comprehending diverse realities of social systems.[3]
This biological research finds its apex in Luhmann’s systems theory of communication, whereas he utilizes Husserl’s phenomenology. Luhmann relocates Husserlian correlation between intentionality of consciousness (noesis) and its regime of meaning (noema) into the social systems theory. In Luhmann’s view, Husserl had utilized a theory of second-order cybernetics, operationally-closed autopoietic systems, and radical constructivism.[4]
Luhmann’s theory of social systems and communication is framed in cybernetic phenomenology. He appropriates biological theory of autopoiesis, rendering it crucial in his systems thinking. I make phenomenological clarification to improve on some limitation of Luhmann’s systems theory, complementing the epigenetic position.
Luhmann’s Synthesis: Phenomenology and Cybernetics
Luhmann is influenced by Talcott Parsons’ sociology of general action in showing relevance to the systems approach. However, in his theoretical works, Luhmann uses the general framework borrowed from the biological concept of self-organization in process and network.
Furthermore, he appropriates Husserl’s phenomenology of sense, meaning, and horizon in the cybernetic framework. “The form in which consciousness executes its operations is called by Husserl (in connection to Brentano) Intention.” “Intention is nothing but the positing of a difference.”[5] Intention is now the primal operation, and in its first step a sense differentiates itself out of horizon of an environment.
For instance, a ship is located within its horizon—but by moving, it realizes its function. The ship is not merely bound to its actual location, because its horizon is a horizon of possibilities. Sense making is the interplay between the actual and the possible within a horizon of the sea. Sense a la Husserl implies a unity of the difference between the actual and the possible. Luhmann defines sense in terms of the distinction between self-reference and other reference. Systems operate within the medium of sense and distinguish between self-reference and other-reference. The actualization of self-reference (one subsystem) correlates with other-reference (other subsystem).
Luhmann is considerably influenced by the two Chilean biologists, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, a younger neuroscientist, who was actually a student of the former. Their Santiago theory has initiated a radical shift to a systems theory of cognition, which is identified with the process of life.
In fact, Maturana is influenced by cybernetics and seeks to develop the organization of the living in connection with the phenomenon of perception. He writes: “The nervous system operates as a closed network of interactions, in which every change of the interactive relations between certain components always results in a change of the interactive relations of the same or of other components.”[6]
Based on a biological theory of autopoiesis, Luhmann conceptualizes systems theory in three main types: systems of communication (social systems), systems of life (bodies, the brain, cell, among others), and systems of consciousness (minds). Each system is in relationship with each other’s environment. This refers to Luhmann’s creative synthesis of biology with social theory of systems. A concept of communication is not merely restricted to personal dialogue, but a linguistic turn entails a broader spectrum of communication in each social system.
For instance, if I buy a book, this action can be understood as economic communication. Watching TV, I enter to mass media communication, or to political communication, when I join the voting for the election of a congress person or president. These examples show that one can communicate with money, mass media, or ballots. This perspective appears to be code-switching with systems for interaction rather than languages.
Systems Society and Communication
Luhmann classifies all of societies (the past, the present, the future) as the systems in which social evolution has continued to steer through complexity along with functional differentiations. His systems theory requires a universal claim, and cybernetics is utilized on the basis of the sense (or meaning). Generalizing the basic concept of the cybernetics, he interprets biological notion such as system/environment or complexity to enhance the idea of meaning (a basic concept of sociology).[7]
Thus he defines society within the communication systems, in which humans enter to diverse multiple realities; humans cannot communicate, or monopolize it, but “only communication can communicate.”[8] The economic system is also unique in distinction from all the other singular systems such political system, cultural system, or religious system. It is important to see life of individuality attached to the social systems, thus it refers to systemic individuality.
Along with communication, the position of the observation is an integral part of the systems in distinctions and construction of reality—in its own operational autopoiesis. If reality is conceived as a cognitive construct, thus as an effect or correlate of observation; then description of reality becomes that of observation. The second order observation or second order cybernetics is more important in modern society, as concerned with the reality-construction of observing systems; this feedback can be seen, for instance, in the case of politics and mass media.
The second-order observation involves the first-order observation (this book is green), observing why it is green. No observation without a blind spot or prejudice brings us closer to the essential light of truth, because reality is constructed in dependence upon blind spots. The second aspect of general second-order cybernetics is not concerned with clearing away or unmasking all the blind spots (like Marx’s critique of ideology or Freud’s psychotherapeutic cure). Rather systemic theory of the society takes them as such seriously as a condition of systemic reality and complexity.[9]
The function systems of modern society are observing systems, and it is a reality that is constituted by second-order observation subsystems, which are operational in their own autopoiesis. We follow the legitimizing systems such as science, economy, politics, or mass media of which we are dependent. They are also explained by the second order observation.
For instance, there is the relation between politics and the mass media (the second order observation). The mass media create a so-called public opinion as a mass media observation that observes the citizen’s observations of politics through agreeing or disagreeing with the government. In turn, the latter continuously observes how it is observed by the mass media. This systemic approach to political communication focuses on how facts are observed and how a political party is more favorably observed in competition with other political party. Likewise, all modern function systems practically observe their own operations in reference to the level of second-order observation.
[1] Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed., enl.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 175.
[2] H. R. Maturana, “Autopoiesis.” In Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organizations, ed. M. Zeleny (New York: North Holland, 1981), 21-32.
[3] Francisco Varela, “Describing the Logic of the Living: The Adequacy and Limitations of the Idea of Autopoiesis,” in Milan Zeleny (ed.), Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organization (North Holland, New York, 1981), 36-48.
[4] Luhmann, Die neuzeitlichee Wissenschaften und die Phänomenologie (Vienna: Picus, 1996), 47.
[5] Ibid., 31.
[6] Cited in Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 96.
[7] Jurgen Habermas, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,1985), 369-73. Habermas makes a substantial and detailed critical analysis of Luhmann in chapter 6 (pp.369-497).
[8] “How Can the Mind Participate in Communication?” In Materialities of Communication, ed. H. U. Gumbrecht and K. L. Pfeiffer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 371. [371–87]
[9] Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained From Souls to Systems (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2006), 75.